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Initial Interest Confusion "Internet
Troika" Abandoned?
A Critical Look At Initial Interest
Confusion As Applied Online
Connie Davis Nichols*
ABSTRACT
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Brookfield Communications, Inc.
v. West Coast Entertainment Corp. seemingly created a standard to be
applied in trademark infringement cases on the Internet. Despite the
cautions contained within the Ninth Circuit's holding, Brookfield
ushered in an era in which many courts placed emphasis on three
factors of the "likelihood of confusion" test finding initial interest
confusion in many online infringement cases based solely on these three
factors. For over a decade, inconsistent application within the Ninth
Circuit and other jurisdictions created a disjointed body of case law on
initial interest confusion online. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc.
provides some clarity but necessitates a review of the applicable
standard when determining infringement online. This Article
evaluates and reviews the Ninth Circuit's opinions in Brookfield and
Network Automation and a sampling of circuit cases that have
considered initial interest confusion in an online context. This Article
suggests that the Ninth Circuit in Network Automation sought to
clarify its holding in Brookfield and to reject subsequent holdings that
misapplied the likelihood of confusion test in order to eliminate
divergent holdings, most evident within the Ninth Circuit itself,
regarding the appropriate analysis of trademark infringement online.
The Article concludes by arguing that the likelihood of confusion
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Scholarship Symposium in Hong Kong on May 12, 2014. Thanks to Peter Yu and Tee Jim Tan
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factors are flexible enough to address emerging technology without the
cookie-cutter approach created by the misapplication or interpretation
of Brookfield that was the "Internet Troika."
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I. INTRODUCTION
"We must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet
context; emerging technologies require a flexible approach."'
Since the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's opinion
in Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.
applied the initial interest confusion doctrine to the Internet,
trademark holders have wielded their rights to an extent that has
created an environment of what some have labeled "bullying," 2 and
others have classified as "trademark trolling." 3 Indeed, the rigid
1. Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir.
1999).
2. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) defines trademark
bullying as "a trademark owner that uses its trademark rights to harass and intimidate another
business beyond what the law might be reasonably interpreted to allow." See Request for
Comments: Trademark Litigation Tactics, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/litigation-study.jsp (last modified Jan. 31, 2012, 10:34 AM).
3. "Trademark trolling," like bullying, is often used to refer to vexatious litigation or
claiming rights greater than those to which the trademark holder is entitled. This moniker was
patterned after the other intellectual property "trolls" in patents and copyrights. See Arty,
Rajendra, Trademark Trolls-A New Phenomenon?, INTELL. PROP. MAG., Dec. 3, 2012, at 30.
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formula that the court in Brookfield sought to avoid evolved precisely
into the standard procedure for online trademark infringement in
many jurisdictions.4 The last decade of courts' analyses of alleged
trademark infringement online has been marked by the use of the
"Internet Troika," a standard originating from the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in Brookfield.5 The various issues created by Brookfield
including the disjointed case law amongst the circuits on initial
interest confusion, the inconsistent applications by courts within the
Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Network
Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc.6 warrant a
review of the standard for determining trademark infringement
online. This Article evaluates the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Brookfield and compares it to the court's most recent opinion in
Network Automation.7 This Article suggests that the court in Network
Automation sought to clarify its limited holding in Brookfield and to
disavow the holdings in subsequent cases in order to dispel the
rampant confusion amongst courts, most evident within the Ninth
Circuit itself, regarding the appropriate analysis of trademark
infringement online. The Network Automation court pressed for
clarity by reemphasizing the necessity of a full analysis of the
traditional likelihood of confusion factors, articulated in AMF Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats,8 when determining trademark infringement online.
Part II of the Article provides a brief overview of trademark law and
infringement generally.9 Part III provides a short history of the 1962
Amendments to the Lanham Act and traces the origin of initial
interest confusion in the brick-and-mortar context.10 Part IV outlines
the development of the Internet Troika and initial interest
confusion in an online context." Part V provides an in-depth review
of seventy-four post-Brookfield cases, charting each court's
determination of initial interest confusion in the Internet context.12
4. See id.
5. The "Internet Troika" is the three AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats factors that the
Ninth Circuit in Brookfield used to determine whether there was a likelihood of confusion in the
Internet context. Those factors as outlined by the court are: "(1) the similarity of the marks; (2)
the relatedness of the goods and services offered; and (3) the simultaneous use of the Internet as
a marketing channel." Garden of Life, Inc. v. Letzer, 318 F. Supp. 2d 946, 963-64 (C.D. Cal.
2004).
6. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.
2011).
7. See infra Part IV, Part V.
8. 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part TV.
12. See infra Part V.
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Part VI discusses the Ninth Circuit's most recent decision citing initial
interest confusion and critically assesses the court's assertion that
Brookfield has been misinterpreted based upon a reading of the
Brookfield and Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications
Corp.13  opinions.14  The Article concludes by arguing that a
cookie-cutter application of a set of factors is not appropriate in
determining likelihood of confusion in the trademark analysis.
Instead, it is important to always evaluate all factors in the likelihood
of confusion test and recognize that the factors articulated in each
circuit are not exhaustive but rather provide a guide for reviewing
claims of trademark infringement on a case-by-case basis.
II. TRADEMARK AND INFRINGEMENT GENERALLY
It is important, before beginning a discussion of the initial
interest confusion doctrine, to start with a brief overview of trademark
law. Simply stated, a trademark is a word, phrase, symbol, design, or
other feature used in commerce to distinguish one's goods or
services.15 Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act1 6 defines infringement as:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising
of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. 17
Thus, the rights obtained in a trademark are limited property rights
that only protect continued use of a mark in commerce against uses
that create a likelihood of consumer confusion.18 Indeed, the Supreme
13. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
14. See infra Part VI.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
16. Lanham (Trademark) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 32(1), 60 Stat. 427, 437 (1946)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012)).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
18. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117
(2004) ("The holder of a registered mark (incontestable or not) has a civil action against anyone
employing an imitation of it in commerce when 'such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive."' (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a))).
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Court provided the basic objectives of trademark law in Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Products Co.19 The Court stated simply that:
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark,
"reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions," for it
quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item-the item with this
mark-is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she
liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that
it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards
associated with a desirable product.2 0
As such, "the likelihood of confusion" standard evolved to determine
when a trademark holder's rights have been infringed.
In determining whether a user has infringed, after establishing
ownership of a valid trademark and use in commerce, courts
historically employ a multifactor likelihood of confusion test.21 The
first court to employ the multifactor "likelihood of confusion" test was
the Second Circuit in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.22
The court in Polaroid found the following factors instructional in
determining whether a particular use of a mark is likely to cause
consumer confusion and, therefore, infringing the holder's rights to
the trademark:
(1) the strength of the plaintiffs mark;
(2) the similarity of plaintiffs and defendant's marks;
(3) the competitive "proximity of the products;"
(4) the likelihood that plaintiff will "bridge the gap" and offer a
product like defendant's;
(5) "actual confusion" between products;
(6) good faith on the defendant's part;
(7) "the quality of defendant's product;" and
(8) "the sophistication of the buyers."23
Each circuit subsequently adopted its own likelihood of
confusion test, which differed somewhat from the Polaroid factors.24
19. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
20. Id. at 163-64 (citations omitted) (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01[2] (3d ed. 1994)).
21. See infra note 23 and accompany text (identifying the multifactor "likelihood of
confusion" test recognized by each circuit); see also Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the
Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (empirically
analyzing and comparing the "likelihood of confusion" test utilized by each circuit).
22. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
23. Id.
24. FIRST CIRCUIT: "(1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the similarity of the goods [or
services]; (3) the relationship between the parties' channels of trade; (4) the relationship between
the parties' advertising; (5) the classes of prospective purchasers; (6) evidence of actual
confusion; (7) defendant's intent in adopting the mark; [and] (8) the strength of plaintiffs mark."
Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. AASTAR Mortg. Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Astra
Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1205 (1st Cir. 1983)).
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THIRD CIRCUIT: "(1) the degree of similarity ... ; (2) the strength of the owner's mark; (3) the
price of goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention expected of consumers when
making a purchase; (4) the length of time defendant has used the mark without evidence of
actual confusion arising; (5) the intent of defendant in adopting the mark; (6) evidence of actual
confusion; (7) whether the goods, though not competing are marketed through the same channels
of trade and advertised through the same media; (8) the extent to which the targets of the
parties' sales efforts are the same; (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers
because of the similarity of function; [and] (10) other facts suggesting that the consuming public
might expect the prior owner to manufacture a product in the defendant's market or that he is
likely to expand into that market." Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983)
(citing Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978)).
FOURTH CIRCUIT: "a) the strength or distinctiveness of the [plaintiffs] mark; b) the similarity
of the two parties' marks; c) the similarity of the goods/services the marks identify; d) the
similarity of the facilities the two parties use in their businesses; e) the similarity of advertising
used by the two parties; 0 the defendant's intent; and g) actual confusion." Pizzeria Uno Corp. v.
Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing Sun-Fun Prods. V. Suntan Research & Dev.,
656 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1981)).
FIFTH CIRCUIT: "(1) the type of the trademark allegedly infringed, (2) the similarity between
the two marks, (3) the similarity of the products or services, (4) the identity of the retail outlets
and purchasers, (5) the identity of the advertising media used, (6) the defendant's intent, and (7)
any evidence of actual confusion." Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th
Cir. 1998) (citing Conan Props., Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 1985)).
SIXTH CIRCUIT: "1. strength of the plaintiffs mark; 2. relatedness of the goods; 3. similarity of
the marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. likely degree of
purchaser care; 7. Defendant's intent in selecting the mark; [and] 8. likelihood of expansion of
the product lines." Frisch's Rests., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648
(6th Cir. 1982) (quoting AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979)).
SEVENTH CIRCUIT: "[(1)] the type of trademark, [(2)] the similarity of design, [(3)] similarity of
products, [(4)] identity of retail outlets and purchasers, [(5)] identity of the advertising media
used, [(6) the alleged infringer's] intent, and [(7)] actual confusion." Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross
Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1185 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready
Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381-82 (7th Cir. 1976)).
EIGHTH CIRCUIT: "(1) the strength of the owner's mark; (2) the similarity between [the
parties'] marks; (3) the alleged infringer's intent to 'pass off its goods as those of the trademark
owner in adopting the mark; (4) the type of product, its costs, and the conditions of purchase; (5)
the products' competitive proximity; and (6) incidents of actual confusion." Gen. Mills, Inc. v.
Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086,
1091 (8th Cir. 1980)).
NINTH CIRCUIT: "1. strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of the marks;
4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. type of goods and the degree of
care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7. Defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and 8.
likelihood of expansion of the product lines." Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348-49.
TENTH CIRCUIT: (a) the degree of similarity between [the marks] in (i) appearance; (ii)
pronunciation . . . ; (iii) verbal translation of the pictures or designs involved; (iv) suggestion; (b)
the intent of the actor in adopting the designation; (c) the relation in use and manner of
marketing between the goods or services marketed by the actor and those marketed by the other;
[and] (d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers of the goods or services involved.
Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938)).
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While each circuit's factors vary slightly, circuits agree that no one
factor is dispositive. Rather, all circuits maintain that the factors
must be balanced in light of the individual facts of each case.
2 5
Indeed, a finding of a likelihood of confusion after the balancing of the
factors is necessary to establish infringement under the Lanham Act.
26
The use of a multifactor likelihood of confusion test has thrived
and has been the basis in determining other forms of confusion that
constitute an infringement of trademark rights. Despite no court yet
employing additional factors after its circuit developed its multifactor
test, courts continue to maintain that the multifactor list is not
exhaustive and is only demonstrative of the factors to consider when
determining infringement. While the focus of the trademark
infringement analysis centers on prevention of certain types of
consumer confusion and consumer fraud, courts nonetheless have
found that trademark law also serves other important policies such as:
(1) increasing the quality of products by incentivizing investments in
marks that are readily identified by consumers, and (2) protecting the
goodwill investment of a mark holder.2
7 The introduction of the
"initial interest confusion" doctrine exemplified the courts' use of the
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: "(1) type of mark, (2) similarity of mark, (3) similarity of the products the
marks represent, (4) similarity of the parties' retail outlets and customers, (5) similarity of
advertising, (6) defendant's intent and (7) actual confusion." Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc.
v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 122 F.3d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Dieter v. B & H Indus. of
Sw. Fla., Inc., 880 F.2d 322, 326 (11th Cir. 1989)).
FEDERAL CIRCUIT: "(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. (2) The similarity or dissimilarity
and nature of the goods . . . described in an application or registration or in connection with
which a prior mark is in use. (3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels. (4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. 'impulse'
v. careful, sophisticated purchasing. (5) The fame of the prior mark . . . . (6) The number and
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods. (7) The nature and extent of any actual
confusion. (8) The length of time during and the conditions under which there has been
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion. (9) The variety of goods on which a mark is
or is not used . . . . (10) The market interface between the applicant and the owner of a prior
mark . . . . (11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark
on its goods. (12) The extent of potential confusion . . . . (13) Any other established fact probative
of the effect of use." In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting In
re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
25. See, e.g., Natural Organics, Inc. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 426 F.3d 576, 578 (2d Cir.
2005).
26. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992).
27. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1896 (2007) (suggesting that courts "felt social and economic pressure to
broaden their understanding of the goodwill embodied in a trademark"); see also Nicholas S.
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 525-27 (1988) (noting that
trademarks exist to enhance consumer decisions and to create incentives for firms to produce
desirable products).
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multifactor likelihood of confusion test to condemn conduct that
impacts the above-referenced policies of trademark protection.28
III. EXPANSION BEYOND POINT OF SALE AND SOURCE CONFUSION: THE
INTRODUCTION OF INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION
Likelihood of confusion, as discussed in Part II, is the essential
element of a trademark infringement action. It has been generally
accepted as the "heuristic device to assist in determining whether
confusion exists."29 Over the years, however, the concept of likelihood
of confusion has expanded significantly from its origins. Originally,
the basis for trademark infringement stemmed only from claims that
purchasers were likely to be confused or deceived as to the origins or
source of the products. In 1962, the Lanham Act was amended to
delete the words "purchasers" and "source or origin" from the
definition of infringement.30 The legislative history suggests that
amendment was intended to make the likelihood of confusion analysis
the focal point of trademark infringement and not the product
purchase.31  In reviewing the legislative intent of the 1962
28. See Connie Davis Powell, We All Know It's a Knock-Off! Re-Evaluating the Need for
the Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine in Trademark Law, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2012) (explaining
that contemporary trademark policy can be divided into two core approaches: consumer
protection and protection of the goodwill of the mark).
The goodwill approach seeks to protect the investment in a trademark by the owner
from misappropriation and trade diversion. This approach does not focus on confusion
by consumers, but rather seeks to protect the investment of the trademark owner. The
protection of the goodwill developed in a trademark is also assured in the Lanham Act
by providing a qualified property right to the owner for as long as the mark is used in
commerce to designate the source of goods and services. The two approaches of
trademark policy are embodied in the Lanham Act's definition of infringement. The
Lanham Act protects the goodwill of the trademark by providing the remedy to the
trademark holder for unauthorized use of a trademark. Likewise, the Lanham Act
guards against deception in the marketplace and thereby protects the consumer.
Id. at 8-9 (citations omitted); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:
An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269-70 (1987) (arguing that the consumer
protection and the goodwill approach work concurrently to create an efficient marketplace by
lowering search costs for the consumer and providing an incentive to the brand holder to invest
monies in the brand); Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1998).
A reliable, stable, and efficiently structured trademark system benefits consumer and
business interests alike. Trademarks serve the interests of consumers because they
reduce search costs and allow buyers to make rational purchasing and repurchasing
decisions with speed and assurance [while simultaneously creating] incentives for
firms to create and market products of desirable qualities, particularly when these
qualities are not observable before purchase.
Id.
29. Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 778 (7th Cir. 2004).
30. See S. REP. No. 87-2107 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2850.
31. See id. at 2844, 2847, 2850-51. "One change is the omission of the underlined words
from the following quotation from clause (a): 'on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source or origin of such goods or
890
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amendment, many courts found the amendment o extend the reach of
the Lanham Act beyond mere purchasers.32 Thus, courts began to
recognize additional types of confusion such as pre-sale confusion and
post-sale confusion-types of confusion that are based upon timing,
but governed by the established likelihood of confusion test.3 3 Indeed,
this rationale by the courts allowed for the introduction of "initial
interest confusion," another concept based upon timing of the
confusion.
Building upon the 1962 amendment o the Lanham Act and the
expansion theory that protection reached beyond purchasers and the
point of sale, the concept of pre-sale or initial interest confusion3 4 was
introduced by the Second Circuit in Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz,
Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons.35 In establishing the concept
of initial interest confusion, the Second Circuit was tasked with
sorting through the details of an intricate relationship between two
piano companies, ultimately finding that there was intent by
Grotrian-Steinweg to capitalize on the Steinway trademark by its
adoption of the "Steinweg"36 name and slogan.37 While the court found
that no consumer would believe at the time of purchase of a
Grotrian-Steinweg piano that they were in fact purchasing a Steinway
piano, the court explained "the harm to Steinway ... is the likelihood
that a consumer, hearing the 'Grotrian-Steinweg' name and thinking
it has some connection with 'Steinway', would consider it on that
basis."38 The court continued its discussion by stating plainly that
"[t]he 'Grotrian-Steinweg' name . .. would attract potential customers
services."' Id. at 2850 (emphasis added). "The purpose of the proposed change is to coordinate the
language here with that used elsewhere and to omit the word 'purchasers', since the provision
actually relates to potential purchasers as well as to actual purchasers. The word 'purchasers' is
eliminated so as to avoid the possibility of misconstruction of the present language of the
statute." Id. at 2847.
32. See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295 (3d
Cir. 2001).
33. See id.
34. The Ninth Circuit has been often credited with creating the idea of initial interest
confusion. However, initial interest confusion dates back to 1975. See Jennifer E. Rothman,
Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
105, 108, 109 n.10 (2005) (noting that the court-created initial interest confusion doctrine "was
first adopted over thirty years ago and has been vastly expanded in recent years with the advent
of the Internet").
35. See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d
1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding actual confusion at point of purchase was not necessary for a
likelihood of confusion analysis for initial interest confusion).
36. The history of both companies' names merited discussion in the case. The owners of
the Steinway had changed their name from Steinweg to Steinway upon immigrating to the
United States from Germany. Indeed, one of the sons remained in Germany and continued to
make pianos and sold the company to Grotrian and partners. See id. at 1333-34.
37. See id. at 1342.
38. See id.; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text (explaining the significance of
the history of the companies' names).
2015] 891
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
based on the reputation built up by Steinway . . . ."39 The court noted
that the initial interest confusion would arise from the businesses'
similar names. Thus, in Grotrian, the Second Circuit created
"pre-sale" or "initial interest" confusion.40
The Second Circuit in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum
Corp. further honed the concept articulated in Grotrian.41 Here, the
court opined that the use of the name "Pegasus" by the defendant was
an impermissible trade upon the reputation built by Mobil Oil, who
had adopted and used the Pegasus as its company's symbol.42 In
determining whether there was infringement by the defendant, the
court found that while no third party would do business with Pegasus
Petroleum believing it to be related to Mobil Oil, "an oil trader might
listen to a cold phone call from Pegasus Petroleum ... when otherwise
he might not, because of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is
related to Mobil." 43 This pre-sale confusion or initial interest
confusion, according to the court, "works a sufficient trademark
injury." 44
Not all circuits were quick to adopt the initial interest
confusion doctrine. The Federal Circuit in Weiss Associates, Inc. v.
HRL Associates, Inc. stated: "[t]his court ... does not address or
embrace the theory of initial confusion."45 Similarly, the First Circuit
declined to find infringement based upon initial, fleeting confusion in
Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.4 6
In Astra, Astra Pharmaceutical attempted to enjoin Beckman from
using "ASTRA" on a computerized blood analysis machine.47 In
determining that there was no likelihood of confusion, the court used
its eight-factor likelihood of confusion test.48 The key factor, the court
found, was the sophistication of the purchasers.49 The court
determined that the cost of the equipment and the fact that the
equipment was sold only to hospital chemistry labs eliminated any
likelihood of confusion.50 The court acknowledged that there was a
possibility of brief confusion when a nurse or technician familiar with
39. Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1342. Again, the court noted that the pronunciation put forth
made the two names sound confusingly similar. Id.
40. See id.




45. Weiss Assocs., Inc. v. HRL Assocs., Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
46. See Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201,
1207-08 (1st Cir. 1983).
47. See id. at 1203.
48. See id. at 1205.
49. See id. at 1206.
50. See id.
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the blood analyzer encounters a representative from the Astra
Pharmaceutical company.5 1 However, the court declined to find
sufficiently actionable confusion based upon initial interest.52
Prior to the Internet line of cases, there were only a dozen or so
cases reported finding trademark infringement based upon initial
interest confusion.53 Indeed, the courts in these reported cases were
not concerned with actual confusion or the protection of the consumer
from deception but rather the protection of the goodwill developed by a
company in each of their respective trademarks.54  Prior to the
Internet line of cases, courts only recognized the doctrine of initial
interest confusion in two limited circumstances: (1) when the dispute
involved companies that provided similar goods or services,55 or (2)
where companies market to the same limited customer base.5 6 It is
worth noting that, even in these limited circumstances, courts did not
abandon the multifactor test. And, in most instances, courts provided
an in-depth review of each of the factors as it related to the specifics of
the case at bar.
IV. INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION AND THE INTERNET-BROOKFIELD
AND THE INTERNET TROIKA
The first case to apply the initial interest confusion doctrine to
the Internet was Brookfield.57 In Brookfield, the Ninth Circuit created
a simplified test to determine whether the use of a trademark as a
metatag was likely to cause consumer confusion.58 Indeed, the Ninth
51. See id. at 1207.
52. See id. In so finding, the court suggested that only confusion that would affect "the
ultimate decision of a purchaser whether to buy a particular product" is actionable and the
sophistication of the purchaser dictated a finding of no likelihood of confusion. See id.
53. See Rothman, supra note 34, at 122-24, 140, 158.
54. See Jason Allen Cody, Initial Interest Confusion: What Ever Happened to
Traditional Likelihood of Confusion Analysis?, 12 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 643, 660 (2003) (noting that
courts that have recognized initial interest confusion have done so "to prevent a junior user of a
mark from misappropriating the goodwill of a trademark owner and from securing an advantage
otherwise unavailable").
55. See generally Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455 (4th Cir. 1996)
(finding likelihood of confusion with competing hosiery products: L'eggs Looks and Legs Looks);
McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Guardia Drug Co., 984 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (granting injunctive
relief for likelihood of confusion for trade dress confusion between ULTRA LACTAID and
ARBOR ULTRA LACTASE); Blockbuster Entm't Grp. v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (finding likelihood of confusion between VIDEOBUSTER and BLOCKBUSTER);
Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (evaluating
likelihood of confusion in the context of two popular jean makers).
56. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998); Porsche
Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Manny's Porshop, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Foxworthy v.
Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
57. Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
58. See id. at 1054-55. The litigation involved the use of the term "MovieBuff' as a
domain name by West Coast Entertainment for its video rental stores. Brookfield, which made
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Circuit, in reviewing the facts of the case, determined that the use of
the traditional eight-factor test was not well suited for analyzing the
issue.59 In deciding the issue, the court used what has been termed
the "Blockbuster Analogy" to justify its rationale for its finding. The
court opined:
Using another's trademark in one's metatags is much like posting a sign with another's
trademark in front of one's store. Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it
"Blockbuster") puts up a billboard on a highway reading-"West Coast Video: 2 miles
ahead at Exit 7"-where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located
at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast's store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive
around looking for it. Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store
right by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there. Even consumers who prefer
West Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue searching for West Coast since
there is a Blockbuster right there. Customers are not confused in the narrow sense: they
are fully aware that they are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no reason to
believe that Blockbuster is related to, or in any way sponsored by West Coast.
Nevertheless, the fact that there is only initial consumer confusion does not alter the
fact that Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast's acquired goodwill.6 0
The court then proceeded to consider only the following
Sleekcraft factors: "(1) the virtual identity of marks, (2) the
relatedness of plaintiffs and defendant's goods, and (3) the
simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing channel" to find a
likelihood of confusion based on the initial interest confusion
doctrine.61 These three factors later became known as the "Internet
Troika." In making this determination, the court stated:
Although there is no source confusion in the sense that consumers know they are
patronizing West Coast rather than Brookfield, there is nevertheless initial interest
confusion in the sense that, by using "moviebuff.com" or "MovieBuff" to divert people
looking for "MovieBuff" to its web site, West Coast improperly benefits from the goodwill
that Brookfield developed in its mark.
62
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Brookfield was the beginning of
a long line of cases establishing what seemingly became the standard
for online trademark infringement.63 But while the Brookfield holding
"MovieBuff" software for the entertainment industry, learned of this use by West Coast
Entertainment. Brookfield subsequently obtained a federal registration for "MovieBuff."
Brookfield instituted suit shortly thereafter, alleging that West Coast Entertainment's use of
MovieBuff in its metatags and as a domain name infringed Brookfield's trademark. See id. at
1043.
59. See id. at 1062 n.24.
60. Id. at 1064.
61. Id. at 1054 n.16 (quoting Comp Exam'r Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc., No. 96-0213, 1996
WL 376600, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1996).
62. Id. at 1062.
63. See, e.g., PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., LCC, 319 F.3d 243, 253 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Brookfield, 147 F.3d at 1062, to support the conclusion that initial interest confusion is
actionable); Promatek Indus., Ltd., v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002) (adopting
Brookfield, 147 F.3d at 1062); Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269
F.3d 270, 293 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Brookfield, 147 F.3d at 1057, to support the conclusion that
initial interest confusion is actionable); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456,
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was widely embraced as precedent for initial interest confusion
online,64 some courts remained reluctant to fully adopt the holding
without additional consideration.65 Indeed, a member of the Ninth
Circuit seemed troubled by Brookfield's wholesale adoption. In a
concurring opinion in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp., Judge Berzon questioned the validity and
impact of the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Brookfield.66  Writing
separately, Judge Berzon expressed her concern that the Brookfield
holding "would expand the reach of initial interest confusion from
situations in which a party is initially confused to situations in which
a party is never confused."67 Judge Berzon continued by writing that
465 (7th Cir. 2000) (adopting Brookfield, 147 F.3d at 1062, 1064); Faegre & Benson, LLP v.
Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1246-47 (D. Minn. 2005) (supporting Brookfield, 147 F.3d at 1066,
but allowing for fair use of plaintiffs trademark in context of criticism); Bayer HealthCare LLC
v. Nagrom, Inc., 72 U.S.P.Q.2D 1751, 1755 (D. Kan. 2004) (citing Brookfield, 147 F.3d at 1057,
1062, as basis for liability under initial interest confusion theory); Comerica Inc. v. Fifth Third
Bankcorp, 282 F. Supp. 2d 557, 573 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Brookfield, 147 F.3d at 1057, for
finding that there is increased chance of initial interest confusion on Internet); Bayer Corp. v.
Custom Sch. Frames, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 503, 509 (E.D. La. 2003) (citing Brookfield, 147 F.3d
at 1057, 1062, to support its holding that use of trademark terms in metatags was infringing);
Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1120 (D. Minn. 2000) (citing Brookfield,
147 F.3d at 1062, with approval but limiting case's holding to circumstances in which defendant
stands to benefit financially); BigStar Entm't, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185,
210-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (indicating approval of Brookfield, 147 F.3d at 1056, while citing and
distinguishing facts); N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 115 (D. Mass.
2000) (citing Brookfield, 147 F.3d at 1057, to support the conclusion that trademark
infringement is more likely online than offline); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F.
Supp. 2d 176, 190 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Brookfield, 147 F.3d at 1062-63, to support
application of initial interest confusion to domain name); Shepard's Co. v. Thomson Corp. ex rel.
W. Grp. Div., No. C-3-99-318, 1999 WL 777944, at *6 (S.D. Ohio July 15, 1999) (citing Brookfield,
147 F.3d at 1062-65, for initial interest confusion theory); N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub.
Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing
Brookfield, 147 F.3d at 1062, to support use of initial interest confusion in metatags and domain
name cases).
64. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§§ 23:5-6 (4th ed. 2011) (embracing initial interest confusion generally and the Brookfield
holding).
65. See, e.g., Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 466 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
("The Court agrees with the criticism that the harm caused by initial interest confusion in the
internet context is minimal as 'with one click of the mouse and a few seconds delay, a viewer can
return to the search engine's results and resume searching for the original website."' (quoting
Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))); J.G. Wentworth, S.C.C. Ltd.
P'ship v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. CIV.A.06-0597, 2007 WL 30115, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4,
2007) (citations omitted) ("I respectfully disagree with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in
Brookfield."); Tdata Inc. v. Aircraft Tech. Publishers, 411 F. Supp. 2d 901, 908 n.8 (S.D. Ohio
2006) ("Although the Sixth Circuit has noted the import the Ninth Circuit assigns to these 'three
most important factors,' the Sixth Circuit has arguably not expressly adopted the Internet trinity
approach as controlling. Because the three factors are subsumed in the traditional eight-factor
approach, the Court assigns the former approach some persuasive-but not controlling-weight."
(quoting PACCAR, 319 F.3d 254-55)).
66. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034-36 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1034.
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the holding in Brookfield could lead to a finding of infringement "when
a consumer is never confused as to source or affiliation, but instead
knows, or should know, from the outset that a product or web link is
not related to that of the trademark holder because the list produced
by the search engine so informs him."6 8
Notwithstanding the caution and criticism expressed by Judge
Berzon of Brookfield in Playboy, the Internet Troika became the sine
qua non for trademark infringement online. Initial interest confusion
became widely accepted as a cause of action citing Brookfield as
support. While courts seemed eager to accept the departure from the
traditional likelihood of confusion test, there was not a consensus
among academics as to the legitimacy of the abbreviated likelihood of
confusion test.
Scholar Jennifer Rothman expressed skepticism of both the
Brookfield holding, and its unquestioned adoption, in Initial Interest
Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law.6 9 In the
article, Rothman pinpoints the deficiencies in the initial interest
confusion doctrine as applied to the Internet and advocates for a
solution that considers (a) all factors of the likelihood of confusion test
and (b) whether there is more than de minimis confusion of a potential
customer of the product.70 Rothman maintains that the change in
technology and the overall sophistication of consumers necessitates a
new rule.71  Notwithstanding the criticism of the implications of
permitting Brookfield to subsist as controlling, Brookfield remained
the standard for allegations of online trademark infringement.72
68. Id. at 1034-35.
69. See Rothman, supra note 34.
70. See id. at 179 (arguing that courts should eliminate initial interest confusion and
reclaim pre-sale confusion); see also id. at 183 ("Limiting actionable confusion to that which is
more than de minimis allows for the use of disclaimers to remedy short-lived pre-sale
confusion.").
Allowing a finding of trademark infringement on the basis of mere "initial interest"
does not promote any of the goals of trademark law. One of the greatest dangers of
initial interest confusion is that it is often used to deny consumers access to
information about the goods and services offered by competing sellers. Such
information is crucial for the efficient operation of competitive markets and protects
the public's ability to choose between reasonably-priced products. Application of initial
interest confusion harms consumers by eliminating such choices and information
without any compensating benefit.
Id. at 129.
71. See id. at 179-89.
72. It is important to note that despite major criticism of the holding in Brookfield, a
subsequent practice utilizing technology to link trademarks with search results prompted courts
and scholars to shift in focus from initial interest confusion to whether use of trademarks as
keywords to trigger sponsored advertising constituted a "use in commerce" of the trademark. See
generally Uli Widmaier, Use, Liability and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.




Similarly, Eric Goldman criticized the initial interest confusion
doctrine as applied in the Internet context in Deregulating Relevancy
in Internet Trademark Law.73 Referring to the emergence of the
initial interest confusion doctrine in online trademark disputes as
"[t]rademark law's assault on the Internet," Goldman noted that
without limitations, "trademark law has the capacity to
counterproductively destroy the Internet's utility for everyone."7 4
While the criticism of the Brookfield holding and adoption of
the trinity of factors to establish Internet trademark infringement
have been noted, Graeme Dinwoodie sought to provide insight into the
rationale for what today seems illogical for establishing trademark
infringement online.5 Dinwoodie writes:
The court's willingness to find confusion based on these three factors alone would
appear to reflect an enhanced concern that consumer confusion might easily result
online given the popularization of the use of the Internet without concomitant public
understanding of the medium.
7 6
Dinwoodie submits that the Ninth Circuit, and subsequently
other circuits, has taken a paternalistic approach to trademark law
policy, finding that consumers need protection in this new medium of
communication.7 7  The courts, in adopting the Internet Troika,
expanded trademark protection online through "reactive
lawmaking"-the fiction identified in Dinwoodie's work as
adjustments of pre-existing laws to new social norms.78 According to
Dinwoodie:
Numerous judicial expansions of trademark law have been effected by generalized
reference to the need to protect consumer association otwithstanding that traditional
rules of trademark law had not previously offered relief in the factual circumstances in
question.
7 9
This, of course, is the case with initial interest confusion
online. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit stated as much in GoTo.com v. Walt
Disney, as it continued to promulgate its review of online infringement
using only three factors-"(1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the
73. Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J.
507, 509 (2005).
74. Id. ("[Trademark law could jeopardize the Internet's potential as an information
resource and a catalyst for competition [because] emerging trademark law doctrines have
allowed trademark owners to excise socially beneficial content and to take unprecedented control
over their channels of distribution.").
75. See Graeme Dinwoodie, Trademark Law and Social Norms (Sept. 5, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Iowa Law Review), available at
http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/papers/EJWPO207.pdf.
76. Id. at 16.
77. See id. at 17.
78. See id. at 12-18. Reactive lawmaking, according to Dinwoodie, is the assertion that
pre-existing legal norms are being applied to new social realities. See id. at 12.
79. Id. at 1.
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relatedness of the goods or services, and (3) the 'simultaneous use of
the Web as a marketing channel."'80
While the academics debated the legitimacy of the Internet
Troika and the rationale of the various jurisdictions' decisions to apply
this limited likelihood of confusion test to allegations of infringement
on the Internet, courts were utterly confused about which test to apply
for consumer confusion online. The following section takes a sampling
of cases citing initial interest confusion and categorizes them based on
the approach applied by each court.
V. POST-BROOKFIELD CONFUSION AMONGST COURTS
Notably, Circuit Judge O'Scannlain authored both the
Brookfield and the GoTo.com1 opinions, which triggered the
beginning of the confusion amongst lower courts and other circuit
courts regarding the appropriate analysis of initial interest confusion
in online trademark infringement disputes. Citing his previous
opinion in Brookfield, Judge O'Scannlain opined in GoTo.com, "[iln
Brookfield, we noted how only a subset of the Sleekcraft factors are
needed to reach a conclusion as to whether there is a likelihood of
confusion. We emphasize that observation here. . . ."82  Judge
O'Scannlain's rationale for these opinions can best be described as
stemming from a paternalistic concern that individuals are easily
susceptible to being confused on the Internet and that trademark law
80. GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 n.16 (9th Cir. 1999));
see also id. at 1206-07 (stating "for now, we can safely conclude that the use of remarkably
similar trademarks on different web sites creates a likelihood of confusion amongst Web users"
even if the parties were not offering directly competing products). The court stated:
With respect to Internet services, even services that are not identical are capable of
confusing the public. Although even Web tyros can distinguish between a web site
that, for example, provides discounted travel tickets and one that provides free Web-
based e-mail, a user would almost certainly assume a common sponsorship if the sites'
trademarks were the same. The yahoo.com web site is just one example of Web genies
that coordinate a bevy of distinct services under a common banner. Indeed, Disney's
own portal shows the potential for one company to provide a host of unrelated
services. Whereas in the world of bricks and mortar, one may be able to distinguish
easily between an expensive restaurant in New York and a mediocre one in Los
Angeles, the Web is a very different world. Our ever-growing dependence on the Web
may force us eventually to evolve into increasingly sophisticated users of the medium,
but, for now, we can safely conclude that the use of remarkably similar trademarks on
different web sites creates a likelihood of confusion amongst Web users. The ever-
growing number of tentacled conglomerates may force us to conclude that even one
hundred and one products could all be sponsored by a single consortium.
Id. (citations omitted).
81. See GoTo.com, 202 F.3d 1199; Brookfield, 174 F.3d 1036.
82. GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1206.
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necessarily needed to fill the gap.83 Judge O'Scannlain's paternalistic
view of Internet users sharply differed from Judge Berzon's view,
which was expressed in Playboy.84 As previously noted, the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Brookfield and its subsequent endorsement of the
initial interest confusion doctrine in the Internet context in
GoTo.com85 and Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc.86
caused significant confusion amongst courts across the country.
Brookfield ushered in an era of increased initial interest
confusion allegations in trademark litigation, with many courts
relying on Brookfield as the template for establishing infringement.
This Section summarizes the results of an analysis of seventy-four
total opinions-twenty-four by the various US Courts of Appeal and
fifty by various US District Courts-which considered initial interest
confusion in the Internet context and cited to Brookfield between 1999
and 2013. These courts' opinions were placed into four possible
categories based on the courts' analysis of initial interest confusion: (1)
courts that employed the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis,
addressing all of the relevant factors; (2) an analysis that elevated the
Internet Troika factors and either excluded the remaining likelihood
of confusion factors or employed a burden-shifting analysis that did
not comport with traditional likelihood of confusion analysis; (3) an
analysis that relied solely on the Internet Troika factors articulated in
Brookfield and its progeny, or in some cases, even fewer factors; or (4)
an analysis that incorporated a fair use framework.
83. See id. at 1207 ("We now reiterate that the Web, as a marketing channel, is
particularly susceptible to a likelihood of confusion since . .. it allows for competing marks to be
encountered at the same time, on the same screen.").
Although the use of computers may once have been the exclusive domain of an elite
intelligentsia, even modern-day Luddites are now capable of navigating cyberspace.
Furthermore, the question in this analysis is not how sophisticated web surfers are
but, rather, how high the cost is of choosing one service-that is, one web site-over
another on the Web. We agree with our previous conclusion that this cost is negligible:
it is simply a single click of a mouse. . . . Navigating amongst web sites involves
practically no effort whatsoever, and arguments that Web users exercise a great deal
of care before clicking on hyperlinks are unconvincing.
See also id. at 1209 (citations omitted).
84. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir.
2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) (emphasizing Internet users' sophistication and an individual's
ability to make a choice) ("There is a big difference between hijacking a customer to another
website by making the customer think he or she is visiting the trademark holder's website (even
if only briefly), ... and just distracting a potential customer with another choice, when it is clear
that it is a choice.").
85. GoTo.com, 202 F.3d 1199.
86. 304 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Figure 1. Table Summarizing Findings
#1 #2 #3 #4 Total
Traditional Influenced Troika Fair Use
Only
First 1st- I 1st- 1 Ist-0 Ist-0 Ist-2
Circuit D.C.'s - 1 D.C.'s - 1 D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s -0 D.C.'s - 2
4 Total
Second 2nd-I 2nd-0 2nd-0 2nd-0 2nd-I
Circuit D.C.'s - 6 D.C.'s - 1 D.C.'s - 1 D.C.'s -1 D.C.'s - 9
10 Total
Third 3rd - I 3rd - 0 3rd - 0 3rd - 0 3rd - I
Circuit D.C.'s - 5 D.C.'s - 1 D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s -0 D.C.'s - 6
7 Total
Fourth 4th - I 4th - 0 4th- I 4th - 0 4th - 2
Circuit D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s - 1 D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s -0 D.C.'s - 1
3 Total
Fifth 5th - 0 5th - 0 5th - 0 5th - 0 5th - 0
Circuit D.C.'s - 1 D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s - I D.C.'s -0 D.C.'s - 2
2 Total
Sixth 6th- I 6th- I 6th - 0 6th - 0 6th - 2
Circuit D.C.'s - 2 D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s -0 D.C.'s - 2
4 Total
Seventh 7th - I 7th - I 7th - 0 7th - 0 7th - 2
Circuit D.C.'s - 3 D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s -0 D.C.'s - 3
5 Total
Eighth 8th - 0 8th - 0 8th - 0 8th - 0 8th - 0
Circuit D.C.'s - 1 D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s -0 D.C.'s - I
1 Total
Ninth 9th - 3 9th - 6 9th - 0 9th - 2 9th - I1
Circuit D.C.'s - 9 D.C.'s - 10 D.C.'s - 3 D.C.'s -1 D.C.'s-23
34 Total
Tenth 10th- I 10th - 1 10th - 0 10th - 0 10th - 2
Circuit D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s - I D.C.'s -0 D.C.'s - 1
3 Total
Eleventh 1Ith-0 11th-i I1th-0 1Ith-0 1th-I
Circuit D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s - 0 D.C.'s -0 D.C.'s -0
1 Total
Totals Circuits - 10 Circuits- 11 Circuits- 1 Circuits - Circuits -
D.C.'s - 28 D.C.'s - 13 D.C.'s - 6 2 24
Total - 38 Total - 24 Total - 7 D.C.'s -2 D.C.'s-49
Total - 4 Total -74
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Figure 2. Analysis of Total Cases
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Figure Sb. District Court Decisions Based on Internet Troika or Less
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VI. NETWORKAUTOMATION: THE NEW STANDARD?
After more than ten years of the abbreviated Internet Troika
factors being the standard for trademark infringement online, the
Ninth Circuit, in Network Automation, revisited the issue to consider
whether the new test properly achieved the goals of trademark law.
The Ninth Circuit, in its review, reversed the district court's ruling
applying the Internet Troika.87 In reversing the lower court's finding,
the Ninth Circuit reiterated its adherence to two long-stated
principles: (1) that the factors articulated in Sleekcraft are non-
exhaustive, and (2) that the factors "should be applied flexibly,
particularly in the context of Internet commerce."88 Indeed, the court
concluded that the trial court erred in applying the Internet Troika
test to a keyword case without complete consideration of all the
Sleekcraft factors.89  The court pointedly stated that the Internet
Troika test was intended only for Internet domain name infringement
cases and was not intended to be a substitution for adherence to the
above-stated principles.90
A. The Holding
Network Automation involved the two polarizing issues in
online trademark infringement-whether use of trademarks as a
keyword constitutes use in commerce and initial interest confusion.
The case provided great facts for the Ninth Circuit to address both
issues. Network Automation, Inc. (Network Automation) and
Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc. (Advanced Systems) were
competitors in the job-scheduling software market.91  Network
Automation purchased Advanced Systems' federally registered
trademark ACTIVEBATCH as a search-engine keyword, which
triggered Network Automation's sponsored ads in the search results
for ACTIVEBATCH. 92  The sponsored ads did not contain the
ACTIVEBATCH mark in their title or text.93 However, Network
Automation identified itself in the URL associated with the sponsored
ad.9 4 After receiving several cease and desist letters from Advanced
Systems, Network Automation filed for a declaratory judgment that
87. See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1142
(9th Cir. 2011).
88. Id. at 1149.
89. See id. at 1154.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 1142-44.
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its purchase of ACTIVEBATCH as a keyword did not constitute
trademark infringement.95 Advanced Systems counterclaimed for
trademark infringement and moved for a preliminary injunction.96
The district court issued a preliminary injunction against
Network Automation's use of ACTIVEBATCH as a search-engine
keyword, finding that Advanced Systems was likely to succeed on the
merits for likelihood of confusion using the "Internet trinity" factors:
(1) "the similarity of the marks," (2) "relatedness of the goods or
services," and (3) "simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing
channel."97 The district court found that all three of these factors
favored Advanced Systems.98 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated
the injunction.99 The court quickly disposed of the "use in commerce"
issue by adopting the Second Circuit's holding in Rescuecom Corp. v.
Google, Inc.100  The court then shifted its attention to what it
considered the reigning issue in the case-likelihood of confusion.'0 '
As such, the court focused its attention on the likelihood of confusion
analysis and provided an in-depth analysis of initial interest confusion
after a renewed review of the arguments presented in the case.102
Network Automation argued that its use of the
ACTIVEBATCH mark was legitimate "comparative, contextual
advertising."103 Indeed, Network Automation further contended that
its use presented sophisticated consumers-the target consumer for
the software that both parties sell to-with clear choices on the
availability of services other than those provided by Advanced
Systems.104  Advanced Systems, however, characterized Network
Automation's behavior as "hijacking [its potential customers']
attention with intentionally unclear advertisements" that were likely
to cause consumer confusion.05 The Ninth Circuit began its analysis
of the arguments of the parties by reciting the standard for likelihood
of confusion-Sleekcraft.0 6 "The Sleekcraft factors are intended as an
adaptable proxy for consumer confusion, not a rote checklist," wrote
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1143-44.
98. See id. at 1143.
99. See id. at 1142.
100. See id. at 1145 (citing Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir.
2009) (holding that use of a trademark as a keyword to trigger sponsored advertisements is "use
in commerce" under the Lanham Act)).
101. See id. at 1145.
102. See id. at 1145-55.
103. Id. at 1145.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 1145-46.
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Judge Wardlaw for the court.107 Indeed, the court explained that the
Sleekcraft test must be applied in "a flexible manner,"1os
understanding that the eight factors are not exhaustive and that only
some of the factors are relevant to determine whether confusion is
likely based upon the facts of the case.109 After setting the stage for
the discussion of trademark infringement in the Internet context, the
court embarked upon the task of explaining its holding in Brookfield.
The Ninth Circuit wrote that when it first encountered the
issue of likelihood of confusion for trademark infringement online in
Brookfield, the court cautioned the circuit that the Internet and
emerging technologies require a "flexible approach.""10 Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit declared that courts have adopted a mechanical
approach to dealing with trademark infringement and in doing so,
have misinterpreted the circuit's emphasis on the three factors used to
decide Brookfield-the "Internet trinity" or "Internet Troika"-as
being the sole factors to consider when there is an allegation of
trademark infringement online."' The court wrote: "[w]e did not
intend Brookfield to be read so expansively as to forever enshrine
these three factors . . . as the test for trademark infringement on
the Internet."1 12 And "[d]epending on the facts of each specific case
arising on the Internet, other factors may emerge as more
illuminating . . . ."113 Turning to the Sleekcraft factors, the court held
that the most relevant factors for keyword-advertising cases were: "(1)
the strength of the mark; (2) the evidence of actual confusion;
(3) the type of goods and degree of care likely to be exercised
by the purchaser; and (4) the labeling and appearance ... and the
surrounding context [of the search] results page."11 4 Finally, the court
107. Id. at 1145 (citing Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt.,
Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) ("This eight-factor analysis is 'pliant,' illustrative rather
than exhaustive, and best understood as simply providing helpful guideposts."); Dreamwerks
Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The factors should not be
rigidly weighed; we do not count beans."); Eclipse Assocs. Ltd. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d 1114,
1118 (9th Cir. 1990) ("These tests were not meant to be requirements or hoops that a district
court need jump through to make the determination.")).
108. Id. at 1145.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 1145-46 ("When we first confronted issues of trademark infringement and
consumer confusion in the Internet context over a decade ago in Brookfield, we noted that '[w]e
must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet context;
emerging technologies require a flexible approach."') (quoting Brookfield Comme'ns, Inc. v. W.
Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999)).
111. See id. at 1148.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1154. It is important to note that the court identified in its opinion in
Brookfield the view that each Internet issue was entitled to its own review. The court noted that
the Internet Troika was the test for domain disputes, but not metatags, and it continued to note
that the test was equally deficient for keyword advertising. See id. at 1148.
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announced that when seeking to establish initial interest confusion,
the trademark owner "must demonstrate likely confusion, not mere
diversion."115
B. Deconstructing the Holding in Network Automation
The Ninth Circuit seized the opportunity in Network
Automation to address what it had determined to be a
misunderstanding of its holding in Brookfield at a time when courts
and scholars were no longer fixated on the "use in commerce" issue.116
Further, the court took the opportunity to highlight the discussions of
the appropriate standard for reviewing likelihood of confusion on the
Internet in the two major cases discussing the issue in the Ninth
Circuit.117 Emphasizing the language in each opinion, which cautions
against a mechanical approach to applying the Sleekcraft factors, the
court further bolstered its position with regard to likelihood of
confusion and initial interest confusion on the Internet.118
Notwithstanding the court's urging, it is important to
thoroughly critique the holding in Network Automation. The last ten
plus years since the holding in Brookfield had been marked by the
Internet Troika-the sine qua non for trademark infringement on the
Internet.119 Based upon the court's discussion, it easily appears that
the court had determined that many cases using Brookfield as the
standard may have been decided wrongly.12 0 Two questions will be
115. Id. at 1149.
116. See id. at 1148. The court quickly embraced the Second Circuit's holding in
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc. and provided very little discussion on the issue of use in
commerce, viewing the issue as one that had been resolved by the circuits. See id. at 1144-45
(citing Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that Google's
sale of trademarks as search engine keywords is a use in commerce)).
117. See id. at 1145-49 (discussing Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp.,
174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) and Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d
1020 (9th Cir. 2004)).
118. See id.
119. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 64, § 24:39.
120. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1148.
While the district court analyzed each of the Sleekcraft factors, it identified the three
most important factors as (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness of the
goods or services, and (3) the simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing channel, for
any case addressing trademark infringement on the Internet. For this proposition the
district court cited GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2000),
which followed Brookfield in emphasizing these three factors. However, we did not
intend Brookfield to be read so expansively as to forever enshrine these three
factors-now often referred to as the "Internet trinity" or "Internet Troika"-as the
test for trademark infringement on the Internet. Brookfield was the first to present a
claim of initial interest confusion on the Internet; we recognized at the time it would
not be the last, and so emphasized flexibility over rigidity. Depending on the facts of
each specific case arising on the Internet, other factors may emerge as more
illuminating on the question of consumer confusion.
Id. (citations omitted).
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helpful in critiquing the court's Network Automation decision. First,
whether the assertion of a misunderstanding made in the Network
Automation opinion parallels the holding in Brookfield? And second,
why did an en banc panel not overrule Brookfield as suggested by
Judge Berzon in Playboy?121
1. Holding Confusion
The court in Network Automation asserts that courts have
misinterpreted the holding advanced in Brookfield despite the court's
warnings that the factors to be considered are not fluid and must be
determined on a case-by-case basis.122 The language most oft cited as
the establishment of the Internet Troika reads as follows:
The factors that we have considered so far-the similarity of marks, the relatedness of
product offerings, and the overlap in marketing and advertising channels-lead us to
the tentative conclusion that Brookfield has made a strong showing of likelihood of
confusion.
12 3
Indeed, the language says that the finding based upon the
Internet Troika is "tentative." The court further wrote:
Because it is possible that the remaining factors will tip the scale back the other way if
they weigh strongly enough in West Coast's favor, we consider the remaining likelihood
of confusion factors .... 124
The court suggested here that a finding for the plaintiff on the
Internet Troika creates a burden-shifting presumption of confusion.125
While the court does not expressly find confusion based solely on the
Internet Troika, the Ninth Circuit created a scenario where the
traditional likelihood of confusion analysis test was altered in such a
121. See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1035 (Berzon, J., concurring).
There will be time enough to address the continuing vitality of Brookfield should the
labeled advertisement issue arise later. I wanted to flag the issue, however, as
another case based on the metatag aspect of Brookfield was decided recently, Horphag
Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2003), so the issue is a recurring
one. Should the question arise again, in this case or some other, this court needs to
consider whether we want to continue to apply an insupportable rule.
Id.
122. See Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1148.
123. Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1058 (9th Cir.
1999)
124. Id.
125. See id.; see also Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1174-75 (9th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("Because the three primary factors for internet
trademarks weigh against Perfumebay, the remaining Sleekcraft factors, actual confusion,
marketing channels utilized, degree of consumer care, Perfumebay's intent, and likelihood of
expansion into other markets, must weigh strongly against a likelihood of confusion to avoid the
finding of infringement."); Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 942 (9th
Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("When this controlling troika,
or internet trinity, suggests confusion is . . . likely, the other factors must weigh strongly against
a likelihood of confusion to avoid the finding of infringement.").
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way that it has been severely misapplied within its own circuit for
over a decade.126
Based on the results of the study of cases decided by courts
within the Ninth Circuit faced with the initial interest confusion on
the Internet issue, these courts wrongly analyzed over half of the
claims before them by not considering all of the Sleekcraft factors.
Based on the analysis, district courts within the Ninth Circuit wrongly
analyzed thirteen of the twenty-four cases considering initial interest
confusion in the online context following the Brookfield decision.
Further, the Ninth Circuit itself employed a flawed analysis to assess
such claims in six of the eleven cases before it between the court's
opinions in Brookfield and Network Automation. The charts below
depict the results of this study, highlighting the cases before courts
within the Ninth Circuit during this time period.
126. See, e.g., Productive People, LLC v. Ives Design, No. CV-09-1080-PHX-GMS, 2009
WL 1507560 (D. Ariz. May 29, 2009) (employing a heightened burden-shifting approach upon the
alleged trademark infringer); Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, No. CV 05-2656-PHX-MHM,
2009 WL 6597892 (D. Ariz. Feb. 2, 2009); Suarez Corp. Indus. v. Earthwise Techs., Inc., 636 F.
Supp. 2d 1139, 1145 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
("If those three factors suggest that confusion is likely, a finding of infringement will follow
unless the other Sleekcraft factors weigh strongly against a likelihood of confusion."); Soilworks,
LLC v. Midwest Indus. Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("In sum, the
undisputed evidence in this case establishes that Soilworks diverts the initial attention of
potential Internet customers to its websites by using Midwest's Soil-Sement trademark in
keywords and metatags."); Storus Corp. v. Aroa Mktg., Inc., No. C-06-2454 MMC, 2008 WL
449835, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("In sum, there is no
triable issue with respect to any of the three factors of the internet trilogy, and defendants have
failed, on behalf of Aroa, to make any showing, let alone the requisite strong showing, that the
remaining factors weigh against a finding of a likelihood of confusion."); Shainin II, LLC v. Allen,
No. C06-420P, 2006 WL 1319405, at *9 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2006) (failing to make any
definitive findings regarding the likelihood of confusion factors) ("[Tihe use of another's
trademarks in metatags may result in 'initial interest confusion' by diverting Internet users to
the defendant's website, thereby allowing the defendant to benefit the goodwill the plaintiff has
developed in its marks."); Garden of Life, Inc. v. Letzer, 318 F. Supp. 2d 946 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
(adopting the heightened burden-shifting approach against the alleged infringer); Flow Control
Indus., Inc., v. AMHI, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199 (W.D. Wash. 2003) ("[M]etatagging a
website with a competitor's mark creates 'initial interest confusion' in violation of the Lanham
Act."); Network Network v. CBS, Inc., No. CV 98-1349NM(ANX), 2000 WL 362016, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 18, 2000) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment and granting plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment in part) (failing to address the traditional likelihood of confusion
factors in assessing a claim of initial interest confusion). But see, e.g., Palantir Techs. Inc. v.
Palantirnet, Inc., No. C 07-03863 CRB, 2008 WL 152339 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2008) (granting
motion for a preliminary injunction after analyzing all Sleekcraft factors).
912
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Summary Table of Analysis by Courts within the Ninth
Circuit
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2. To Correct or Not To Correct the Confusion, That is the Question
Judge Berzon's concurring opinion in Playboy sharply criticized
the Ninth Circuit's abbreviated version of the initial interest confusion
doctrine and the overbroad interpretation that it has been given by
other jurists. 1 2 7 Specifically, Judge Berzon noted that clearly labeled
ads should not give rise to a trademark infringement claim because
the consumer is not confused when the website is clearly labeled.128
Judge Berzon wrote in Playboy: "I concur in Judge Nelson's careful
opinion in this case, as it is fully consistent with the applicable
precedents. I write separately, however, to express concern that one of
those precedents was wrongly decided and may one day, if not now,
need to be reconsidered en banc."129 The concern, as so eloquently
stated in the concurring opinion in Playboy, remained that Brookfield
expanded the reach of initial interest confusion from situations in
which a consumer is initially confused to situations where consumers
are never confused.130 This concern was seemingly addressed by the
court in Network Automation by its consideration of all of the
Sleekcraft factors and its emphasis on the importance of a fourth
factor: whether a consumer knows, or should know, from the outset
that a product or web link is not related to that of the trademark
holder because the consumer is informed by the context of the link. 131
With regard to this fourth factor, the Ninth Circuit noted that
the district court correctly examined the text of Network Automation's
sponsored links but failed to consider "the surrounding context."132
Noting that in Playboy, the court had found it important that the
127. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034-36 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring).
128. See id. at 1034-35.
I do not think it is reasonable to find initial interest confusion when a consumer is
never confused as to source or affiliation, but instead knows, or should know, from the
outset that a product or web link is not related to that of the trademark holder
because the list produced by the search engine so informs him. There is a big
difference between hijacking a customer to another website by making the customer
think he or she is visiting the trademark holder's website (even if only briefly), which
is what may be happening in this case when the banner advertisements are not
labeled, and just distracting a potential customer with another choice, when it is clear
that it is a choice. True, when the search engine list generated by the search for the
trademark ensconced in a metatag comes up, an internet user might choose to visit
westcoastvideo.com, the defendant's website in Brookfield, instead of the plaintiffs
moviebuff.com website, but such choices do not constitute trademark infringement off
the internet, and I cannot understand why they should on the internet.
Id.
129. Id. at 1034.
130. See id. at 1035.
131. See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1154





alleged infringer's search engine did not clearly segregate the
sponsored advertisements from the objective results, the Ninth Circuit
explained that analysis of the "labeling and appearance of the
advertisements as they appear on the results page includes more than
the text of the advertisement, and must be considered as a whole."33
Considering the technological evolution of online search engines
between 1999, when Brookfield was decided, and 2011, the date of the
Network Automation opinion, the Ninth Circuit found the fact that
"Google and Bing have partitioned their search results pages so that
the advertisements appear in separately labeled sections for
'sponsored' links" to be particularly relevant in Network
Automation.134 As such, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court
erred by failing to weigh the Sleekcraft factors flexibly to match the
specific facts of the case at hand.135 Stating its departure from any
endorsement of sole reliance upon the three-part test identified in
Brookfield,136 the court noted that these factors, while "highly
illuminating in the context of domain names," fail to "discern whether
there is a likelihood of confusion in a keywords case."137 As such, after
a detailed and flexible analysis of all of the Sleekcraft factors in the
context of the facts in this particular case, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Given the nature of the alleged infringement here, the most relevant factors to the
analysis of the likelihood of confusion are: "(1) the strength of the mark; (2) the evidence
of actual confusion; (3) the type of goods and degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser; and (4) the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and the
surrounding context on the screen displaying the results page."1
3 8
Based on the court's explicit emphasis upon the importance of
analyzing all of the Sleekcraft factors to reach a finding based on the
most relevant factors on a case-by-case basis, the Ninth Circuit found
the district court abused its discretion by solely relying upon the
Internet Troika in Network Automation.139
There is no doubt that the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Network




136. See, e.g., GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir, 2000)
(following Brookfield to emphasize the Internet Troika factors as the most important factors in
online trademark infringement: "(1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness of the goods
or services, and (3) the 'simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing channel"' (quoting
Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999))).
137. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154.
138. Id.
139. See id. (citations omitted) ("The district court did not weigh the Sleekcraft factors
flexibly to match the specific facts of this case. It relied on the Internet 'troika' . . . . Because the
linchpin of trademark infringement is consumer confusion, the district court abused its
discretion in issuing the injunction.").
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Brookfield holding in its own circuit. The fact that the misapplication
spread beyond its circuit to other courts is somewhat troubling;
nonetheless, Network Automation provided the clarification that was
long needed despite the Brookfield court's caution against such a
formulaic approach. Network Automation amounts to a departure
from the Internet Troika and a return to the likelihood of confusion
factors. The Ninth Circuit presented no new standard but rather
re-endorsed the standard that has served trademark law well.
VII.CONCLUSION
A decade long application of the Internet Troika has come to a
screeching halt. The Brookfield court cautioned that its holding was
never a standard to be used in all cases. Nevertheless, its import was
the creation of a standard that was inappropriate as a general
standard for trademark infringement online. Undoubtedly, some
courts got it wrong, but what the review of a sampling of cases
indicates is that a number of courts got it right-staying true to the
likelihood of confusion factors. Indeed, in the review of the
seventy-four post-Brookfield cases, the courts that fell into the first
category, employing the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis to
claims of online initial interest confusion, and the fourth category,
finding fair use, correctly analyzed the claims before the court. Thus,
in total, forty-three of the seventy-four cases sampled were analyzed
correctly. The chart below reflects these results. What the sampling
reveals is that the likelihood of confusion factors work, even in a
changing world of technology, providing the flexibility that is
necessary in evolving technology.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Post-Brookfield Cases Sampled According to Circuit
This table identifies all of the seventy-four cases sampled,
which were classified according to each court's analysis of the claim of
online trademark infringement before it. These results include both
district and circuit court cases, classified according to the respective
circuit for which each court issuing an opinion falls.
Circuit of Cases Sampled Classification of
Issuing Analysis
Court
First Circuit 1. Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, 1. #1-Traditional
Inc., 232 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000). Analysis
2. N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights 2. #2-Influenced
Club, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001). by Brookfield
3. Philbrick v. eNom, Inc., 593 F.
Supp. 2d 352 (D. New Hampshire 3. #1-Traditional
2009). Analysis
4. Northern Light Tech., Inc. v. 4. #2-Influenced
Northern Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d by Brookfield
96 (D. Mass. 2000), aff'd 236 F.3d 57
(1st Cir. 2001).
Second 5. Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 5. #1-Traditional
Circuit F.3d 439 (2d Cir. 2004). Analysis
6. Ascentive, LLC v. Op. Corp., 842 6. #1-Traditional
F. Supp. 2d 450 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Analysis
7. BigStar Entm't, Inc. v. Next Big 7. #1-Traditional





15. Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check
Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d
270 (3d Cir. 2001).
16. J.G. Wentworth, S.C.C.
P'ship v. Settlement Funding
No. 06-0597, 2007 WL 30115





8. OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine,
Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y.
2000).
9. S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Australian
Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
10. Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, No.
02 Civ. 9377 SAS, 2003 WL
22451731 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 391 F.3d
439 (2d Cir. 2004).
11. Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions
Inc., No. 99 Civ. 100066(HB), 2000
WL 973745 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2000).
12. 777388 Ontario Ltd. v. Lencore
Acoustics Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 56
(E.D.N.Y. 2000).
13. Movado Grp., Inc. v. Matagorda
Ventures, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 6223
LMM, 2000 WL 1855120 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 19, 2000).




















VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
17. Bijur Lubricating Corp. v. Devco
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 722 (D. New
Jersey 2004).
18. Tillery v. Leonard & Sciolla, LLP,
437 F. Supp. 2d 312 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
19. Zurco, Inc. v. Sloan Valve Co.,
785 F. Supp. 2d 476 (W.D. Pa. 2011).
20. Pa. Bus. Bank v. Biz Bank Corp.,
330 F. Supp. 2d 511 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
21. 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com,
Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D. New
Jersey 2006).
+ I.
22. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d
309 (4th Cir. 2005).
23. People for Ethical Treatment of
Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359
(4th Cir. 2001).
24. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google,
Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL

















Fifth Circuit 25. MCW, Inc. v. 25. #1-Traditional
Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, No. Analysis
Civ.A.3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 WL
833595 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004).
26. Bayer Corp. v. Custom Sch. 26. #3-Internet
Frames, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 503 Troika or Less
(E.D. La. 2003).
Sixth Circuit 27. Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 27. #1-Traditional




28. PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan Techs.,
LLC, 319 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2003).
29. Tdata Inc. v. Aircraft Technical
Publishers, 411 F. Supp. 2d 901 (S.D.
Ohio 2006).
30. Wells Fargo & Co. v.
WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d
734 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
31. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural
Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir.
2000).
32. Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac
Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002).
33. Trans Union LLC v. Credit
Research, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029
(N.D. Ill. 2001).
34. Pure Imagination, Inc. v. Pure
Imagination Studios, Inc., No. 03 C
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